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ABSTRACT
In the People's Republic of China, housing reform was launched in the 1980s as a
component of the overall economic reform. In the 1990s, housing policies, privatization
and subsidies combined, were found to contribute to over one-third of the overall
inequality in urban income distribution in China.
My hypothesis is that housing inequalities are reinforced in the reform years. In
the first half, I discuss three types of general mechanisms: the income-regressive nature
of the Housing Provident Fund, the exclusion of rural migrants from urban housing
welfare, and the strengthened work-unit-based inequality in reform years.
In the second half, to offer some empirical support, I conduct a case study of
housing relocation in a large-scale urban redevelopment project-the Xintiandi
redevelopment project in Shanghai. My main findings are that the government formed a
pro-growth coalition with the private business, and middle-to-low income residents were
excluded from the negotiation process. Families in difficulties and families with strong
negotiation power received preferential treatment to facilitate the relocation process.
In summary, market reform has preserved some features of socialism, particularly
the advantages of certain urban population groups with political implications. At the
same time, the market forces are adding new forms of inequalities, which results in an
increasing overall inequality level in urban housing.
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction
1.1 Background
In the People's Republic of China, intra-urban inequality has been on a similar
level to intra-rural inequality since 1994 and had actually surpassed it in 1998 (Lu and
Wang 2002). Since 1978, the economic reform in China has transformed the country
from one with a socialist egalitarian income distribution to one with a more unequal
income distribution. According to Khan et al.'s research, between 1988 and 1995 the
Gini coefficient for the distribution of household income per capita increased from 0.233
to 0.332, or by 42.5%. Unfortunately, the subsidy system and other urban policies were
not adjusted to compensate for the increased wage inequality. Instead, the housing
reform, which was started in 1988, resulted in an extremely uneven distribution of
housing assets and housing services. In 1995, housing policy (privatization and subsidies
combined) accounted for 37% of the overall inequality in urban income distribution in
urban China. Nearly 41% of the housing subsidies were received by the richest 10% of
the urban population, and just over 60% of the rental value of owned housing accrued to
the top 10% of the population. (Kahn et al. 1999)
Housing reform is a component of the overall economic reform launched in 1978.
The older system was based on an implicit social contract that employees received many
basic services, such as housing and medical services, at minimal cost with their low-paid
permanent employment with the state-owned enterprises. As part of this "low-income-
low-expenditure" system, most of China's urban housing was built, owned and
maintained by public work units or city housing bureaus, for the benefit of their
employees or residents. The low rent paid by public housing tenants did not even cover
maintenance costs in most cases. As economic reforms introduced market competition,
state-owned enterprises became profit-seeking entities and could no longer shoulder the
social benefits for its employees, including housing (Rosen and Ross 2000). Different
housing-reform experiments were carried out cautiously and incrementally during the
early 1980s which led to the introduction of a comprehensive housing-reform program by
the central government in 1988.
With the overall objective of housing marketization, the 1988 National Housing
Reform Conference introduced two major policy instruments for the municipal housing
bureaus: first, continue to raise rents to a more competitive level, and, at the same time,
distribute housing subsidies to offset the increases; and second, to begin implementation
of the sale of public-sector housing. One major achievement of the reform during this
period was the "socialization of housing" - meaning the housing-allocation system had to
be delinked from the enterprise gradually through the raising of rents and allocation of
rent subsidies. In 1998, the monetarisation of housing subsidies was widely implemented
in Chinese cities. This involved the termination of welfare housing allocation through
providing direct housing subsidies with a monetary distribution (Lee 2000). With these
reforms, there appeared three major methods of housing supply in urban China:
commercially built private housing at market prices for the high-income group;
commercially built subsidized affordable housing for the middle and low-income groups;
and social housing for rent to the very low-income group (State Council, 1998, quoted in
Wang 2000).
For this study, I examine the contribution of urban housing policies to intra-urban
inequality in transitioning China. The major research question is that, in the market
transitioning from socialism to market-oriented reform, does the introduction of market
forces tend to compensate for the kinds of residential inequalities created by bureaucratic
allocation, or will the commodification of housing create new inequalities and increase
the overall inequality level? My hypothesis is that the latter one is true. Market reform
has preserved some features of socialism, particularly the advantages of many members
of the old political class. At the same time, the market forces are adding new forms of
inequalities, which result in an increasing overall inequality level in urban housing.
1.2 Methodology
In order to explore the changing patterns of inequality in urban China, I first
analyze the patterns and mechanisms of urban housing inequalities in Socialist China and
transitioning China and discuss the key components of the housing reform. Second, I use
the method of case study to analyze the inequalities in housing relocation in urban
redevelopment projects in the late 1990s. The case I use is Xintiandi (Taipingqiao)
Redevelopment project in Shanghai in 2003.
I begin by defining several important concepts. First, throughout, I discuss
housing in the context of urban China. Since the establishment of the People's Republic
of China in 1949, the state has been deeply involved in housing provision in urban China.
In rural China, however, housing has largely remained an individual responsibility.
Second, in the first part, I discuss housing inequalities in the context of urban China in
general; and in the second part, I discuss the urban redevelopment in Shanghai Xintiandi
specifically using a case study methodology. After an introduction of housing patterns in
China, I expect the first part of this study to capture, on a general level, the most
important inner mechanisms of the housing inequalities. Urban China in the late 1990s
has seen accelerated urban redevelopment with the relaxation of redevelopment policies,
such as the legitimization of off-site relocation. I chose the Xintiandi project because of
both its significant scale and my personal access to that community. I provide a detailed
rationale in the latter part of the methodology. Third, I use two main terms to refer to the
different development stages of housing policy in China. "Socialist China" refers to
China from 1949 to before the 1978 reform; "reform years" or "transitioning years"
refers to the time period from 1978 till now, during which China has become an
authoritarian mixed economy.
I chose the case study method as my main investigation method. Yin (1984)
proposed that there are three conditions in judging the appropriate research method: (a)
the type of research question posed, (b) the extent of control an investigator has over
actual behavioral events, and (c) the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to
historical events. He states that the case study is the most appropriate method when "a
'how' or 'why' question is being asked about a contemporary set of events, over which
the investigator has little or no control" (Yin 1984: 20). In the case of this study, I ask a
"how" type of inquisitive question about the inequality issues in housing relocation of an
ongoing urban redevelopment project; therefore, a case study is a useful method of
investigation. At the same time, I understand that a survey is very much needed in order
to answer the "what" and "how much" types of questions. Because of the time and
funding constraints, I was unable to conduct the survey research at this time. The case
study I conducted should be viewed as a preliminary exploration of the topic, which can
lead into a full-scale research project in the future.
The choice of a case study about housing relocation in the urban redevelopment
process originated from my observations of housing conflicts in urban China. Urban
redevelopments were prevalent in urban China since the late 1990s as a series of
institutional changes, ongoing land and housing reforms, and prosperous real estate
market emerged. Shanghai has been the largest city in China and grew significantly in
the 1980s and 1990s. The area of the city's urban districts has expanded about 16 times
and urban population increased by 70% from 1981 to 1998 (Zhang 2002). The Xintiandi
project was one of the largest scale redevelopment projects in Shanghai with a budget of
3 billion U.S. dollars, involving a population of 70,000 (He and Wu 2005). The political
economy of urban redevelopment and the inequalities in housing relocation demonstrate
themselves fully in the case of Xintiandi redevelopment. As mentioned earlier, my
access to that community helped me trace the relocated families and conduct the
interviews, which was also an important reason for choosing this case.
I interviewed a total of nine families, and I also interviewed a Street Government
officer. The selection of the interviewees reflects the mix of different social status and
income level of the residents in the community to capture their different experiences in
the relocation and compensation. I know one of the interviewed families personally, and
I asked them to introduce me to the other eight families who used to be their neighbors.
Requested by me, they intentionally chose families with different backgrounds. The
sample is very small and may not be an accurate representation of the entire
neighborhood. Nonetheless, it is adequate to provide preliminary insights into the
inequalities in compensation in the urban redevelopment process.
As a final note, the proposal for this research was approved by the Committee on
the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects (COUHES) in December 2004. All the
interviews were conducted after the approval and conform to the COUHES principles.
CHAPTER 2
Evolution of Housing Patterns in Urban China
2.1 Introduction
Housing patterns in urban China have gone through many changes since the
establishment of Socialist China in 1949. In general, there are two major periods-the
Socialist period and the Reform Period. In this study, the Socialist period refers to the
phase between 1949 to 1979, i.e., from the establishment of the People's Republic of
China until the economic reform. In this period, China generally adopted the model of
Socialist planning economy and the public sector dominated the production and
distribution of urban housing. After 1979, the central and local governments carried out a
series of experiments in urban housing provision in the context of general economic
reform, which resulted in a changing housing pattern.
2.2 Housing Patterns in the Socialist Period
During the Socialist period, housing was mainly built, distributed, and managed
by the work units (Danwei)1 and the municipal governments in urban China. Below, I
discuss housing delivery, housing quality and the spatial patterns in Socialist China as a
background and comparison to the situation of transitioning China discussed in Chapter
3.
1 The Danwei system is a hierarchy of state-owned workplace units (schools, factories,
hospitals, government agencies, and the like) whose employees were guaranteed a variety
of perquisites denied to peasants in the countryside, including secure jobs, affordable
housing, inexpensive medical care, a range of subsidies for everything from
transportation to nutrition and generous retirement pensions (Lu and Perry 1997).
2.2.1 Housing Delivery
Private housing in China experienced a dramatic decline after the People's
Republic was founded in 1949. Between 1949 and 1956, the municipal governments
claimed their exclusive ownership over lands in the city in accordance with the socialist
transformation of the means of production. Remaining home owners, including business
owners, former government bureaucrats, and well-paid professionals, were pressured to
give up their "surplus" housing to help working-class families under the pressure of the
socialist regime (Whyte and Parishl983). Although home ownership was protected by
the Chinese constitution, by the end of 1956 families owning private housing decreased
to 30%-35%. Subsequently the number of private housing units has not changed much,
although the private share has declined due to new construction in the public sector. The
remaining privately owned houses were passed on from one generation to the next within
the family (Howe 1968).
Under the socialist ideology, public-sector housing provision forms an important
part of the socialist welfare system. Public housing includes work-unit housing and
municipal public housing, and the former constitutes the majority of the supply.
According to the first national survey of housing stock in 323 cities, in 1985 work-unit
housing comprised 75% of the total housing floor area, while housing under direct
management of the municipal housing bureau comprised only 9%, and private housing
16% of the total (Wu 1996). Financially, more than 90% of investments in urban housing
were made from the state budget before 1980. By 1988, the state contributed only 16%,
and the work unit (danwei) financed 52% of annual housing investment on average
(World Bank 1992, P7). Housing investment was seen as an important part of state
enterprise capital investment.
From the individual's perspective, the housing allocation was a queuing process.
Work units established either a formal or informal point system based on marital status,
seniority, and other criteria on which all employees were ranked. Chinese urbanites paid
nominal rent in the Socialist system. For those who lived in rental housing, rent was
about 2-3% of total family income, with additional utility cost raising total housing
expenditures to only 5% of total family income. (Whyte and Parish 1983)
Lee (2000) summarized that distributional inequalities in housing allocation
within work organizations reflected a power relationship. With housing production and
distribution being decentralized to the work unit level, housing distribution was based
largely on the status of the household head, and his /her seniority and position within the
work unit,
2.2.2 Housing Quality
Considering housing as a consumption good rather than a basic need of urban
residents in the socialist system, investment in housing was given a low priority under the
general planning framework that emphasized investment in industries. State investment
in urban housing as a proportion of gross national product (GNP) averaged only 0.8%
from 1949 to 1978 (Zhu 2000). In the largest 192 cities in 1978, the average floor space
per person was only 3.6 square meters, a decline from a reported average of 4.5 square
meters per person in the major cities in 1952 (Whyte and Parish 1983). Over 30 years,
housing stock in Shanghai, the largest city in China, only increased by 58%, despite city
gross domestic product (GDP) expanding by 670%, and urban population growing by
38% (Shanghai Municipal Statistical Bureau [SMSB] 1981, quoted in Zhu 2000).
According to a population census conducted in 1982, 47.6% of urban households in
Shanghai had poor housing, such as dilapidated structures and lack of amenities, and
overcrowding. About 25.1% of households were virtually homeless, temporarily living
with their parents or relatives while waiting for government assignment. About half of
the total housing floor area was substandard without necessary facilities (Shanghai
Annuals 1983, quoted in Zhu 2000).
Nevertheless, Whyte and Parish (1984) suggested that housing quality in Socialist
China was on par with other developing countries of a similar income level. In the mid-
1970s, the number of rooms per dwelling in China was only slightly below the average of
that in other developing cities and there were fewer dwellings with just one room. Some
of the housing amenities in Chinese cities were considerably better than those in other
developing cities. Chinese urbanites were much more likely to have piped water and
electric lighting, but fewer Chinese urban families, on average, had access to private
kitchen, toilet and bathing facilities. They often had shared facilities in the building or
within a short distance (Table 2-1).
Whyte and Parish (1983) also pointed out that another characteristic of Socialist
China is the relative absence of slums. In the 1950s, soon after the revolution, the state
moved quickly to clear the slums in large cities. Most of the buildings in that period had
brick and concrete structures (89% in Whyte and Parish's sample 1983), with few of the
wood and tin shantytowns of other developing countries. By Socialist Chinese standards,
they were still considered crowded urban neighborhoods without in-the-building
amenities. Zhou Shulian and Lin Senmu wrote that "20% of urban residents are slum
dwellers." Many of these slums are often the concentration of uncleared private housing.
Examples include Zhabei and Nanshi in Shanghai, Daobei in Xian, and Daowei in Harbin
(People's Daily, 5 August 1980).
Table 2-1. Urban Housing Conditions in Selected Countries, 1970s
China Other Developing Countrieso
(Mean) (Mean) (Range)
Size and Density
1. Average rooms per
dwelling 2.5 2.9 2.0-3.3
2. Dwelling with only one
room 18% 31% 9-52%
3. Persons per room 1.6 2.0 2.8-1.4
4a. Dwelling with 3 or more
persons per room 24% 27% 50-16%
b. Dwelling with fewer than 1
person per room 18% 31% 9-52%
5. Persons per household 4.4 5.3 4.0-6.5
Amenities
6. Piped water inside house 62% 43% 4-88%
7. Piped water inside house or
within 100 metres 79% 67% 23-94%
8. Electirc lighting 99% 64% 4-96%
9. Kitchen 72/93%@ 79% 61-100%
10. Toilets 18/29%@ 88% 67-99%
11. Fixed bath or shower 23% 40% 4-85%
Ownership
12. Owner-occupied 42% 56% 47-74%
Source: China: Whyte and Parish 1983, P78, Weighted neighbor sample, N=274.
Others: United Nations Statistical Office, Compendium of Housing Statistics, 1972-1974.
Note:
o Sixteen countries with a per capita gross national product in 1976 U.S. dollars of $130
to $600, which brackets China's 1976 figure of $200-300
@The percentage with a private facility is shown to the left of the slash. The percentage
including those sharing facilities with other households in the same building is to the
right.
2.3 Housing Reform
In April 1980, Deng Xiaoping, China's top leader, made a speech on urban
public-sector housing to central government leaders
... urban residents should [be allowed to] buy houses, or to build their own
houses. Not only new houses could be sold, old ones could be sold too. [The
buyers] may buy out-right; [they] may also pay by instalment over a period of 10
to 5 years. [We] must adjust the [public-sector] rent according to house building
costs, and make people think buying worth more than renting... When increasing
rent, low-income workers should be subsidized. (Deng 1980, quoted in Wang and
Murie 1996: 974)
This statement changed the long-standing policy of urban housing being provided
by the state as social welfare, and legitimized the commoditization of housing in China.
Throughout the 1980s, the Chinese government experimented with a series of reform
programs. The first housing reform experiments of selling new housing for building cost
was carried out initially in two selected cities: Xian and Nanning. By 1981, over 60
different cities and towns all over the country had carried out similar experimental
schemes. The average price per square metre of construction floor space was between
120 and 150 yuan. The cost of a typical housing unit was the equivalent of about 10-20
years' salary at that time. Most cities reported low demand for housing purchase.
Beleaguered by high prices, low affordability, inflexible payment methods, and the
alternative choice of low-rent public housing, this round of experiment was formally
abandoned in 1982 (Wang 1992).
In 1983, the State Economic Reform Commission made a proposal to carry out
new pilot tests of commercialization for urban housing. In order to break the demand
constraint, this round of the policy test offered an opportunity for an individual buyer to
pay only one-third of the total price of their housing, including both the new and the
existing housing stock. The other two-thirds were to be subsidized by the employer
(usually a state-owned or affiliated institution) of the buyer and by the city government
(Wang and Murie 1996, Cao and Chu 1990). The local government and reforming state
work units complained about the heavy cost of the subsidy; the buyers did not find the
deal especially attractive in comparison with the low rent of the public housing. The
property rights over the acquired housing units were muddled. What the buyers obtained
were "partial property rights"-rights to reside in but not trade the units on the market.
This round of a sales-oriented reform was terminated in 1985. The policy-makers
concluded that a more comprehensive approach was required, which, at least, should deal
with the financial balance between buying and renting. The draft of the 7 th Five-year
Plan called for the formulation of "a set of well-considered methods as soon as possible
to gradually commercialize housing"(CCP Central Committee, 1985, quoted in Wang and
Murie 1996: 976).
A central government Housing Reform Steering Group was set up by the State
Council in February 1986. At the city level, similar organizations-the Housing Reform
Offices-were set up. In 1988, the State Council Plan for Housing Reform in Urban Areas
formally set up guidelines for the reform of housing rental and promotion of home
ownership. The central Housing Reform Steering Group proposed a comprehensive
reform strategy: adjust rents in the public sector and introduce housing subsidy for all
public-sector employees; and promote sales of public-sector housing (old and new).
Simultaneously, wages were rising with the evolution of market reform, partly in
compensation for the welfare burden shift to individuals. The commodity housing was to
be built and sold by property developers rather than built and distributed by the
government or work unit. The whole scheme was based on the premise that housing
rentals would be increased gradually to the point that buying housing units became a
more sensible decision than renting (Zhu 2000).
Contrary to the policy goal, the housing rental increase, on average, lagged behind
wage increases in the reform era. Housing rental as a percentage of household
expenditure actually declined from 2.6% (1964) to 0.7% (1992). In Shanghai, although
the absolute rentals increased by 3.7 times from 1991 to 1997 (SMSB 1998), housing
rental as a percentage of household expenditures dropped from 0.9% to 0.7%. Resistance
to the housing reforms by social groups with a vested interest in the existing housing
system constrained the momentum of housing rental increases (Zhu 2000). The powerful
group of people who benefited from housing inequalities under the previous
redistribution were still in position to influence policy making in the reform period. The
extent and the scale of rental increases in other cities were far from the level that could
make the maintenance of housing stock commercially viable and the purchase of housing
units economically sensible. In some cities, sales of public housing to the sitting tenants
were tried as another pragmatic measure to get rid of maintenance burdens to raise funds
for housing development. Public housing has been sold since 1994 in Shanghai at a
discount according to the tenant's number of years serving in the danwei and entitlement
to benefits based on seniority, deemed as the cashing out of housing benefits that tenants
deserve over the years of low-wage employment. Up to the end of 1996, 51% of salable
public housing units were sold to 659,000 households, representing 20% of total urban
households (Zhang 1998).
Summarizing the decade-long experience in housing reform, the national
government issued the 1994 policy statement (State Department Policy No. 43-State
Department's Decision on the Deepening of City and Township Housing Reform). Lee
(2000) summarized five of the most important aspects of the 1994 policy statement:
1. Sharing of Housing Responsibility among the state, the work unit, and the
individual. The socialist model of danwei-based housing provision had a direct
negative effect on the efficiency and performance of the work units. The new
strategy would transfer housing provision and management to non-government
specialized property development and management companies in the market.
Housing subsides would form part of the wage package and should not be
allocated in kind.
2. Establishment of the Housing Provident Fund, named after the Central Housing
Provident Fund in Singapore. The state sought to institutionalize the Housing
Provident Fund as a form of involuntary saving to assist home financing. Both
the work unit and the individual would contribute to a common account. The
exact ratio of contribution and other details of the arrangement would be
negotiated at the local level. Designated banks would further supplement the fund
with individual housing loans through a mortgage system.
3. Socialization and Professionalization of Housing Management. The state and the
work unit would progressively reduce its involvement in the production and
allocation process of housing. The consequence was that the housing stock would
be managed through either professional bodies or tenant self-management.
4. Selling Existing Public Rental Housing to Sitting Tenants. As a guiding principle,
the state would gradually sell all existing public housing stock to sitting tenants at
a discount rate of 50% of a valuated price (calculated on the basis of three times
the annual salary of a median-wage worker). Down-payment should not be less
than 30% of the purchase price.
5. More housing for Middle-and Low-income Groups. The state would continue to
produce economic comfort housing for those groups who could not afford to buy.
The annual production of these houses would be less than 20% of total housing
production of any city or township.
In 1998, the state introduced "the monetarisation of housing subsidies". This
policy terminated the welfare housing allocation and started to provide direct housing
subsidies in cash terms. Generally speaking, new housing has to be obtained from the
market, so the low rent of the old public housing would not interfere with the
commoditization of the growing housing market. For example, in Guangzhou, new staff
joining government departments or agencies after September 1997 would get a
monetarised housing subsidy. Those employed before September 1997 could opt to
remain in the old welfare housing system. The monthly housing subsidy in 1998 was
stipulated at 233 yuan for general grade staff, 467 yuan for a section chief and 933 yuan
for a city mayor and equivalent grade. Staff in receipt of a monetarised housing subsidy
would no longer be eligible for buying or renting heavily subsidized welfare housing. In
Shandong Province, as another example, housing subsidies would be tied to wage levels
and are included as part of the salary package. Government staff employed before 31
December 1997 would be paid a lump sum compensation in lieu of welfare housing.
Years of service, rank, and entitled housing space are taken into account when computing
the lump sum cash compensation. Those joining the government service from 1 January
1998 would have their housing subsidies included as part of their monthly remuneration,
at about 25% of their basic wage. Another 5% would be contributed by the employer to
the Housing Provident Fund (Zhu 2000).
At the same time, facilitating institutions were set up for the housing reform. For
instance, a secondary market for public flats and market housing has been established to
promote active circulation of commoditized housing. Selected banks are allowed to
provide individual mortgages to home buyers. Step by step, the state, and the work units
to some extent, are withdrawing from the provision and distribution of housing.
Individuals become the main force in the housing market.
2.4 Summary
The urban housing system in China went through dramatic changes in the 1980s
and 1990s. The reform program has changed the general public's perception of state
housing provision and introduced many market economy elements into the housing
allocation. Housing is increasingly recognized as a consumable commodity rather than a
welfare service. Distribution of housing increasingly goes through market, rather than
bureaucratic allocation. Although property rights issues still exist, housing ownership is
encouraged in the reform. Housing is becoming a shared responsibility among the state,
local government, work unit, and individual. Table 2.3 summarizes the key reform
initiatives since 1979
Table 2-2. Key Housing Reform Initiatives, the People's Republic of China, 1979-
Year Policy Initiatives Range of Results/Evaluations
Execution
1979 Commercial housing sold Xian, Nanning Experiments terminated due
at building cost to demand constraint and
low affordability
1982-1985 Commercial housing Zhengzhou, Experiments terminated due
subsidized by employer Changzhou, to high cost to the public
and city government Siping and sector and limited demand
Shashi
1986-1988 Raise rents in the public Yantai A successful plan with a
sector; introduce housing comprehensive approach,
subsidy for public-sector later used as a model for
employees; and promote other cities
sales of public-sector
housing
1988-1992 National Housing Reform National, with Progress in the sales of
Plan 1988: contents local variations, public-sector housing;
similar to Yantai reform e.g., Shanghai housing situation still linked
plan implemented on a Housing Reform to employer; a housing
national scale Plan 1991 market was not established
1993-1997 Decision on Deepening National Preparation for the
the Urban Housing establishment of a




1998- Termination of Welfare National Establishment of a
Housing Allocation and commercial housing market
the Monetarisation of
Housing Subsidies
In the reform process, privileged people in the Socialist period benefited
enormously from the opportunities in the housing reform, while the urban mass at the
bottom of the work hierarchy suffer from a reduction in housing welfare and the low
level of affordability in the market system. In the next chapter, I discuss the housing
inequalities both in Socialist China and in transitional China.
Chapter 3. The Mechanisms of Housing Inequality
3.1 Introduction
There is a burgeoning literature documenting inequality in housing opportunities
in socialist countries (Chapman and Murie 1996, Szelenyi 1987, Ciechocinska 1987,
Musil 1987, Whyte and Parish 1984). Szelenyi (1983) argues that housing inequalities
are created by the distinctively socialist mechanism, which was supposed to replace the
capitalist market method of allocation. Individuals of higher socioeconomic and political
status have privileged access to housing of good quality and at a low cost. Logan and
Bian (1999) summarized the inequality in housing under the socialist regime with three
main characteristics. First, the largest and best-equipped apartments have consistently
been allocated to persons in positions of authority or with strong informal ties to
authorities. Second, the working units function as the organizational basis of
stratification. Basically, working units compete within government for housing
constructed by state agencies or for the permission and resources needed to build or buy
housing themselves. The rank, sector, and size of the working units are markers of their
formal authority and informal influence in this competition. Third, the socio-economic
differences of the individual have a strong influence on the individual's housing quality.
Even under a socialist regime, a bias in housing allocation favors people with higher
incomes, education, or occupational skills.
3.2 Housing Inequity in Pre-reform Socialist China
In pre-reform urban China, housing production, distribution, maintenance, and
management were conducted at the municipal government and work unit level.
Characteristically, China has a larger proportion of work-unit housing stock compared
with other former socialist countries (Table 3-1). Housing inequalities in pre-reform
socialist China were, to a large extent, work-unit based. The main source of investment
for public housing came from the state annual budget for basic construction projects,
including building new productive, commercial, and service facilities and expanding
existing work places. The second source was the state budget in maintaining and
renovating existing facilities. In both budgets, a category for residential housing was
created for building public rental apartments for the workers in the work units.
Table 3-1 Tenure Structure of Housing Stock in Socialist Economies
Local Individual
Country Enterprises governments Cooperative Ownership
Bulgaria (urban, 1988) 12.3 10.2 0.2 77.3
China (urban, 1988) 54.3 27.0 n.a. 18.7
Hungary (Budapest, 1987) 10.0 30.0 0.9 48.6
Poland (urban, 1989) 12.1 20.3 21.8 45.8
USSR (urban, 1990) 36.9 35.5 6.3 21.4
Source: Renaud (1991); Wu (1996)
Before the reforms of housing and land use, the state work units were responsible
not only for allocating public housing but also for bargaining investment funds from their
supervisory government agencies and developing and managing housing. The bargaining
power of the work unit depended on its rank in administrative hierarchy. In terms of
housing resources, state-owned work units were the main recipients of both state funds
and therefore also of housing development funds. But large-scale collectives might also
receive these funds because their projects for plant development and renovation were
included in state economic plans (Yang and Wang 1992, 71). All the work units, whether
government agencies, nonprofit organizations, or productive and commercial enterprises,
were under the jurisdiction of the government bureaucracy that made all the decisions
concerning the use of these (and any other) funds received. Only work units under the
central ministries were likely to use their housing development funds directly on their
own, because of higher administrative ranking and the local nature of housing
development (Bian et al. 1997). In the allocation of state housing funds, production work
units were preferred over non-production work units under the Socialism ideology.
Before the housing reform, the residents from the same working unit lived in the
same housing block, belonging to and allocated by the working unit. The residents were
heterogeneous in social class and by no means received the same quality housing at the
same geographical location. Social mix in the same residence area, however, did not
mean that everyone was equal in housing terms. The differences between cadres and
workers, higher status professionals and low-skilled technicians were real and significant.
The housing allocation policies in a university in Xian City illustrated the situation well:
The basic eligibility criteria for housing were formal urban residence and permanent
employment by the institution. Then the most important factor influencing housing
entitlement was official status as cadre or worker. Workers were given low priority. A
long service (over 25 years of work experience) higher grade worker at best could get a
two-room apartment. (Wang and Murrie 2000: 402)
In summary, housing was the most heavily subsidized commodity, and it related
directly to the social status of the household head in socialist China, whose occupation
had a strong influence over the household.
3.3 Housing Inequality in Transitioning China
Bian and Logan (1996) proposed two components of inequality in a transitioning
society (1) the extent to which political capital based on the old system, whether through
formal position or informal connections, continues to provide advantages; and (2) the
extent to which new forms of income inequality are created under the new system
because of market mechanisms. Emphasizing the diminution of political privilege, some
early studies proposed that market reform would result in an overall decline in inequality
(Szelenyi 1978). Szelenyi and Manchin (1987) and Nee (1991) also argued that this
initial decline, if it occurs, will likely be followed by increasing inequality derived from
the market system. In Hungary, Szelenyi and Manchin (1987) found evidence of a new
entrepreneurial elite and "commodification of the redistributive privilege" benefiting the
cadre elite, creating enlarging inequality between the rich and the poor.
So, in the market transition from socialism to the market, does the introduction of
market forces tend to compensate for the kinds of residential inequalities created by
bureaucratic allocation, or does the commodification of housing create new inequalities
and increase the overall inequality level? Evidence points to the latter. There seems to
be a growing consensus that the market reform has preserved some features of socialism,
particularly the advantages of many members of the old political class. Party members
and factory managers in the former Soviet Union have discovered that their political
connections and control over scarce resources are profitable (Staniszkis 1991; Burawoy
and Krotov 1992). Privileged access to housing is one of the key mechanisms of such
"commodification of redistributive privileges" in Hungary (Szelenyi and Manchina 1987,
120-121). Researchers have pointed to many ways in which the gradual and partial
reforms made by Chinese authorities have been absorbed into the existing institutional
framework (Walder 1992; Chen and Gao 1993). In China, the subsidy system and other
urban policies were not adjusted to compensate for increased wage inequality. In 1995,
housing policy, privatization and subsidies combined, accounted for more than one-third
of the overall inequality in urban income distribution in urban China. Nearly 41% of the
housing subsidies were received by the richest 10% of the urban population, and just over
60% of the rental value of owned housing accrued to the top 10% of the population
(Kahn et al. 1999). I believe that my research of the mechanism of housing inequality in
transitioning China offers crucial insight into the changing dynamics of social
stratification.
In the following sections of Chapter 3, I discuss major aspects of housing
inequality in urban China, starting with the hypothesis that the housing subsidy is
regressive in nature in urban China, i.e., the richer you are, the more housing subsidy you
receive. After the housing reform, the inequality problems in the housing system in
China became institutionalized in the new policies. First and foremost, housing
subsidies are linked to income through the Housing Provident Fund (HPF). HPF was the
first and is now the most widely used, housing subsidy distribution channel in China. It
was modeled and named after the Housing Provident Fund in Singapore. HPF relies on
mandated contributions from employers and employee-typically, each contributes 5% of
the employee's salary to an earmarked bank account. Fund participants can withdraw
their money to make a down-payment on a new home (Rosen and Ross 2000). As China
is moving towards a more market-oriented wage system where some enterprises, state or
private, are paying differential wages, a fixed percentage contribution both from the
individual and from the employer means that a higher income should generate a greater
contribution from the employer, whereas those in the low-income group, or those who are
regarded as the "households with great difficulties" would be unlikely to benefit from the
reform process (Lee 2000).
The second level of inequality exists on the disparity between enterprises and
regions. In relatively poor parts of the country, many struggling firms cannot afford to
establish HPFs. Workers in these regions are thus denied access to this form of saving
for home purchases, raising issues of equity and fairness. The current system of housing
subsidy distribution is still an employer-based system. The welfare of the enterprise and
local economy, rather than the actual need of the individual and family, decides the
amount of the subsidy individuals receive (Rosen and Ross 2000).
Finally, migrant workers, or the floating population, are still excluded from any
housing benefits distribution from the state after the reform. (Zhu 1998) estimated that
about 60 to 80 million rural labors were working in cities, approximately 30% of the total
urban work force. Migrant workers usually take the hardest manual work, are paid little,
and have no job security. The combination of low income and exclusion from housing
subsidies and access to subsidized housing makes renting and staying in temporary dorms
provided by the employer, e.g., at the construction site, the top housing choices for the
migrant workers.
3.3.1 The Income-Regressive Nature of the Housing Provident Fund
After almost two decades of trial and error, the state decided to promote home
ownership as the only effective way to delink the state from public-housing provision.
The key question is the financial sustainability of the housing reform-how to help people
overcome the affordability hurdle. Intended to be an institutional arrangement for home
financing, the Housing Provident Fund (HPF) was inherently income regressive and
pegged to the work unit.
The HPF is now the most widely used home-financing method managed by local
governments in China. The Chinese HPF is modeled after Singapore's Central Provident
Fund, but with concentration only on housing contributions. The broad policy adopted is
the so-called "3 for 1"policy, where the state, the work units, and the individuals together
share the housing costs (Lee 2000). The HPF is a compulsory savings mechanism with
mandated contributions from employers and employees-the actual rate varies from city to
city, typically each contributes 5% of the employee's salary to an earmarked bank
account. These funds are usually held in the local branch of the China Construction Bank
(CCB), China's designated housing finance bank. These savings belong to the employee
and are exclusively for use of housing purposes. The savings and associated interest
could be inherited or withdrawn by the account owner when s/he retires or leaves
Shanghai. All the opening of new accounts and withdrawal from existing accounts have
to be done through the employers. Wang and Murie (1995) explained that the purpose of
this policy was to accumulate housing development funds and gradually increase
households' purchasing power by limiting spending on other consumer goods. HPF was
therefore designed to channel rising incomes into the housing sector and to avoid
inflationary pressures.
HPF is used for two main purposes (Wang 2001): (1) short-term loans to work units,
housing cooperatives, and developers for developing affordable housing (2) financing
individual households for housing, including when
1. Buying a house:
a. Single large-sum withdrawal to pay for housing purchase: If approved,
account holders are allowed to withdraw as much as required within the
limit of their savings.
b. Monthly withdrawal to pay for housing purchase installments: This was an
older method before the introduction of mortgage lending.
c. Mortgage lending
2. Building a house: Urban employees who married rural partners are allowed to
withdraw their funds for house building in rural areas. To make such a
withdrawal or borrowing, the employee needs to produce evidence of house
building. The limit one can borrow for this purpose is 400 yuan per square meter
and less than 80 square meters in total.
3. Paying rent: if rent is more than 5% of the total monthly household income,
provident funds can be withdrawn to pay rent. This payment is approved once a
year in February or March.
HPF was first tested in Yantai, Shandong Province and Bengbu, Anhui Province
in the 1980s. Shanghai was the first major city to establish HPF. Shanghai had a major
influence on the reform process, and many other major cities followed suit. The
Guangzhou Housing Provident Fund, for example, was set up in 1992. By the end of
September 1997, 1.02 million employees from over 6600 work units had joined the
Guangzhou Housing Provident Fund. Lee (2000) estimates that 90% of the employees
eligible for participation in the Fund have already joined. The fund accumulated per
month is over 50 million yuan. The total contribution accumulated by the end of
September 1997 was about 1,631 million yuan. Some inefficient state-owned enterprises
with losses on their balance sheets were given approval by the government to defer
joining the scheme, but from mid-1995 onwards, work units failing to join the Fund
without approval were penalized.
In Beijing, HPF was established in 1992. By the end of 1999, most large state-
owned organizations and enterprises were participating. The overall contributions from
both employer and employee have been increased from a required 5% of the employee's
monthly salary to 8% by 1998. This fund is again deposited into a special personal
account at the CCB. Each June, a statement is issued through the work unit to the
employee. By June 1998, more than 9,600 work units had joined this system, and the
total number of individual accounts had reached nearly 1.5 million, and total funds
amounted RMB 4.6 billion. In 2000, HPFs were found in more than 100 cities
throughout China, and have accumulated more than 40 billion RMB (USD 4.8 billion) in
funds. (Rosen and Ross 2004)
HPF was designed as a percentage of the income, i.e., the more salary you
receive, the more housing subsidy your work unit will deposit into the fund for you.
Below I analyze how the HPF fails to improve housing affordability for the low-income
group.
In China, rapid economic growth in an environment of economic transitioning
from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy has been accompanied by rising
social inequality. Decades after the 1978 reform, China has changed from one of the
most egalitarian among the developing countries to one with the highest inequality in
income (Table 3-2). The most significant part of income inequality in China is the
dramatic increase of the inequality in the reform years. China ranks the first in the
increase of inequality between 1981 and 1995 in the fifteen countries in a study by the
World Bank (1997).
Table 3-2 Comparing the Gini Index between China
and Other Countries in the World in the 1990s





United Kingdom 36 1991
India 38 1997
China 40 1998
United States 41 1997
Russian Federation 49 1998
Mexico 54 1995
Brazil 60 1996
Source: Habitat (2001 P18, quoted in Wu 2004, 405)
The income of the marginal groups in the transitional China continues to
deteriorate (Table 3-3). Liberalization and privatization in the transitioning economies
often have led to greater income inequality from both the introduction of the market
mechanism and the legacy of the old socialist system (Andrusz et al., 1996; Nee, 1996;
Nee and Cao, 1999). Evidence has been accumulating that increasingly income gaps
have caused a decline in housing affordability in transitioning countries (Renaud 1995,
Rosser et al. 2000).
Table 3-3 The Increase in Social Inequality Measured by Income Groups
Ratio of the income of the group to the
average income of total sample (%)







Source: State Statistical Bureau (2000) Quoted in Wu (2004)
Ratio of the low-income









Wu (2004) categorized the urban poor in China into three major groups: (1)
Urban poor with urban household registration, including laid-off workers retired early in
reform, pensioners, and collective employees, or unemployed urbanites working part time
in the informal job markets; (2) Migrant workers without urban household registration,
either working in the formal workplace as contract workers, mainly in construction or
cleaning and catering sectors or domestic helpers; (3) The traditional urban poor, i.e., the
socialist welfare recipients, mainly families with handicapped members.
In the urban areas, the reform of the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) produced an
accelerating number of laid-off workers. The official unemployment rate was 3.1% in
2001, but taking into account laid-off workers, the urban poverty population could be as
high as 14 million, accounting for 3.6% of the urban population (MoSS and SSB 2001
quoted in Wu 2004). Using survey data of working-age individuals in five large Chinese
cities, Giles et al. (2003) proved that employment shocks were large and widespread,
with unemployment reaching double digits in all sample cities, and labor-force
participation declining by 8% over the period. Most job-leaving was involuntary in
China's reform. Older workers and women were the most vulnerable. Social security
and benefits, which used to be managed by the SOEs, went through a "socialization"
process and were intended to be administered society-wide instead of through the
working units. In the transitioning period, social benefits also underwent shock. For
example, declines in health benefits have affected many individuals. The health
insurance coverage rate of employed workers declined by 12.9% over the period. With
much poorer coverage among those not working (except the retired), overall health
insurance coverage rates for the urban population were surprisingly low-56. 1% in the
five cities and less than 50% in three of the five surveyed cities. Among the targeted
group of older workers, most of the unemployed or out-of-the-labor-force individuals did
not receive any subsidies. Most self-described laid-off workers were not registered as
such, and one-fourth of the registered received no layoff subsidies. Not surprisingly,
most job-leavers reported that they relied primarily upon private assistance, including
support from family members and own savings, to support consumption when not
working.
Interestingly enough, in China, the dominant factor in new urban poverty is the
sector of employment (Table 3-4). The lowest income group is concentrated in the
traditional employment sectors. The combined SOEs and COEs (Collectively-owned
enterprises) employees plus the retired accounted for about 60% of the lowest 20%
income group. The percentages of state institutions and government and administration
continue to decline under the state's policy of promoting the civil service system and
raising the salaries of state administrative employees in the late 1990s. Meanwhile, the
emerging private sector including the joint ventures, private enterprises, and private
businesses account for less than 12% of the lowest income group.
Table 3-4 Composition of the lowest 20% income group of formal urban residents (%)
(1996-1998)
Employment status 1996 1997 1998
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) 29.5 28.1 31.1
Collectively-owned enterprises (COEs) 15.1 16.7 15.3
Retired 14.3 12.9 13.0
State institutions 9.0 5.9 4.9
Government and administration 10.2 4.2 1.5
Non-government social organization 3.8 5.7 6.4
Subtotal 81.9 73.5 72.2
Joint ventures 4.2 1.3 0.7
Private enterprises 5.5 4.7 3.7
Joint private businesses 1.2 3.3 4.0
Private businesses 1.1 1.7 0.7
Subtotal 12.0 11.0 9.1
No stable work 2.6 6.8 8.1
Unclassified 2.6 8.7 10.5
Army 0.8 0.0 0.0
Total sample size (persons) 266 424 406
Source: Survey by the China Social Science Academy, in Xu (1999:71)
In Socialist China, despite the inequality in the bureaucratic allocation, by and
large, people of all positions were given welfare housing. In the HPF fund system,
people working in low-wage sectors are generally disadvantaged by a consistently low
level of housing subsidy from the work units. In most countries, homes priced at three to
five times annual household income are considered affordable, while housing prices in
China are often 10-20 times family income (Table 3-5). In China, according to more
recent statistics, the per capita annual income of the urban poverty group (lowest 5%)
was RMB 2356.6 per year with average household size of 3.51 (State Statistical Bureau
2000, 8.2 RMB = 1 USD). The average price of housing was about RMB 2,250 per
square meter (sqm) in 2002 (China Real Estate Statistics Annual 2004). It will take more
than 16 years of their annual income to buy a 60 square metre apartment (calculated by
author).



























































Notes: Housing cost under Category A only includes the structure construction costs.
Housing cost under Category B is the gross cost, including on-site infrastructure costs
and pre-construction costs, such as the acquisition of the land. Category C designates
housing with a market price of RMB 1500/sqm, still lower than the average market price
of fully commercialized houses.
The annual household income in China is assumed to be RMB 4500. The average size of
a dwelling is assumed to be 60 sqm.
Sources: Yang and Wang (1992, pp. 235-230 quoted in Chen 1996)
3.3.2 Exclusion of Rural Migrants from Urban Housing Welfare
Socialist China had a rigid urban-rural division. The government was the major
force in housing provision and distribution in the urban areas after 1949. The majority of
urban residents worked in state-owned or collective enterprises and were housed in
publicly owned shelters. In contrast, in the rural areas, traditional family houses and
private ownership were not changed fundamentally. Urban-rural migration was strictly
controlled and the urban-rural division existed in almost every other aspect of the social
and economic life of the Chinese people before the reform in 1978; after the reform, the
peasants migrated into the cities in large numbers, supplying the labor force for industrial
development.
Labor migration from rural to urban areas has emerged as a prominent
phenomenon in China since the mid-1980s after decades of stagnation. Although there is
no accurate estimation of the scale of migration, it is commonly believed that tens of
millions of rural migrants are residing in cities without the permanent legal status
required to be there, and a large proportion of these people are circular migrants, i.e., they
move back and forth between the cities and their rural homes frequently. China's Fifth
Population Census reported 121.07 million internal migrants as of the year 2000
(Population and Social Sciences Department, National Statistics Bureau of China, 2001).
Among them, more than 70% were rural-urban migrants, equivalent to 85 million, though
a more commonly cited figure in official speeches and public media is 100 million.
These migrants are at their most economically active ages - almost 70% are between the
ages of 15-49 and 20% between 25-29. (Xiang 2004)
Later in the reform process, government and media in China took another major
turn and started to promote urbanization in recognition of the labor surplus in rural China.
An example is an article in the commentary column of the official newspaper China
Daily in 2004:
The central government last Monday released its No 1 Document for this year, which
recommended increased government spending in grain production, enhanced industrial
restructuring, programs to train and protect migrant workers in cities, and reductions in
various agricultural taxes. ... ... For example, it is crucial that an ever-growing number
offarmers, as soon as possible, become permanent urban residents. (China Daily
February 26, 2004)
Unlike elsewhere in the world where a shortage of affordable housing is the main
constraint limiting the options of migrants, exclusionary policies decreed by the Chinese
state make urban public housing completely off-limits to peasants. In contrast to the
legitimate urban residents who are sheltered by the heavily subsidized state housing
system, rural migrants must seek ways to bypass their financial constraints as well as the
institutional restraints set on urban housing provision.
The housing question of the migrant workers is unique in China because it is
closely related to the rural-urban dichotomy in land policy and housing provision. For
China's migrant workers, urban housing was inaccessible in the pre-reform era, and
unaffordable after the market reform. The urban housing market, limited only to
registered urban residents, was characterized by a very high degree of public provision
and management of housing until the end of the 1990s. Whatever the property rights
were in practice, all new urban housing was without exception constructed with
government investment and then bureaucratically leased through employment.
Residential leases were both locale-based and enterprise-based and decided by an official
urban hukou2 and by being a permanent employee of a state enterprise. The private rental
sector was almost nonexistent. Moreover, the rents for urban housing were heavily
subsidized by the state to match its low-wage policy for urban workers. Ideologically,
urban housing was not perceived as a simple commodity but as a welfare benefit by the
socialist ideology. The state closed the urban housing market to the rural migrants
because of the ideological responsibility to support the urban working class and limitation
of financial resources. (Zhang & Zhao & Tian 2003)
The urban housing market reform was significantly accelerated since the late
1980s as the focus of the market reform shifted to the urban areas. The restructuring of
the housing market is orientated towards the retreat of the state and commodificatoin and
marketizatoin of housing provision as the state tries to separate production and welfare
provision at the work-unit level. Development of commercial housing with marketized
construction and transactions is encouraged. Private or joint-venture developers are
allowed to build and sell or lease residential properties for a profit on the open market at
market price. The urban affordable housing program has been sponsored by the state
only for urban low-income groups with local hukou. The current commercialization of
urban housing is not accessible for the vast majority of rural migrants who are employed
in low-paid positions and without local hukou. Their major means of housing is therefore
2 Hukou refers to the formal urban household registration. Before the reform, rural people
without hukou were not allowed to move and live in the cities. Basic life necessities,
such as food and housing, were allocated to the place of official urban registration.
mainly limited to employer-provided housing or renting on the peripheral of the city (Wu
2002).
The employment of rural migrants, especially in jobs that are particularly
strenuous, dirty, or monotonous, has been increasingly allowed and even encouraged by
the state. Migrants typically take up the undesirable and low-paid jobs in the city, and
there are significant earning gaps between the migrants and the urban residents. Chinese
migrant workers are largely excluded from the mainstream housing market in China.
First, they cannot afford the expensive private housing market; and the household
registration system excludes them from work-unit related HPF system and urban
affordable housing programs. According to Wu's surveys (2002), under such
circumstances, more than half of the migrant workers choose to rent private and public
housing in the suburbs of the cities. For example, around 60% of the migrants lived in
inner suburbs between 1993 and 1997 in Shanghai, and another 30% to 40% of the
migrant workers stay in employer-provided dorms or on construction fields.
Overcrowding seems to be a common feature of migrant housing, with each
person using only about one-third of the space occupied by a typical urban resident. A
family of three would share a single rental room with no facilities and use a corner to set
up a small cooking area with either a kerosene burner or propane stove. In the dorms on
the construction sites, it is common for six to eight workers to sleep in bunk beds in a
temporary shelter of less than ten square meters. These emigrants also tend to live in
dwellings that are pooly equipped with kitchen/bathroom facilities, are used for working
or other purposes in addition to serving as residences, and have non-stable structural
features (such as temporary dorms on construction sites). About 3%-4% of temporary
migrants without formal employment encounter the worst housing conditions. They
cannot afford to rent any housing and have to sleep in public spaces, for example, on the
benches of the public hospitals. (Wu 2002)
Table 3-6 Housing Conditions of Temporary Migrants Versus Local Residents 1995
Per Capita No No Gas! No No
Usable Area Water Propane Kitchen Bathroom
(m2) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Shanghai
Migrant Workers 9.0 4.4 63.8 68.4 66.5
Local residents 18.7 1.1 8.7 34.1 48.8
Beijing
Migrant Workers 7.5 18.5 63.5 74.1 89.1
Local residents 18.4 1.9 19.7 13.0 34.6
Source: Housing conditions of local residents based on results of the 1995 1%
Population Survey in Beijing and Shanghai (Wu 2002)
The migrant workers actually work and live in the city. Spatially they live next to
the formal urban residents with household registration, but in terms of access to and
affordability of housing, migrants seem to live in a totally different space.
3.3.3 Strengthened Work-unit-based Inequality in Reform Years
China's housing reform was initiated by Deng Xiaoping in April 1980. The basic
idea was to commodify (but not necessarily privatize) public housing, so as to release the
work units from their responsibility to provide housing as a welfare good and transform
them into profit-seeking entities. Many researchers argued that the reform would divorce
housing from work units (Yang and Wang 1992; Tolley 1991; Barlow 1988). Work units
in a fully commodified system, would play no direct role in housing, but would simply
provide the income stream through which employees finance home purchases or rentals
in the open market.
In the experimentation period of the reform, the work unit's fundamental role of
social redistribution was not lessened but strengthened. The proportion of work-unit
investment in total housing investment increased. Housing investments have been
decentralized since economic reforms. The state began to withdraw from the housing
investment. According to the World Bank (1992), in 1979 over 90% of all investments
were financed by the unified state-local budget. By 1988, the share of the central
government was reduced to only 16%, while local governments financed an additional
6%. Work units became the major source of housing investments through retained
earnings.
Enterprises with profits were able to build or purchase housing for their
employees. Some enterprises prospered in the early reform period with their political
positioning to buy low (State-controlled price) and sell high (market price). They also
made profits by obtaining tax benefits and gained support from government jurisdictions
to take loans from state banks for both industrial and housing projects. Some other
enterprises, however, were required by the government to sell their products at a state-
controlled price (low), implying low or no profits for them. These enterprises had to
depend on an implicit contract with the government agencies to receive housing funds.
Government agencies continued to have clear advantages. Officials in high-level
government agencies tended to have high civil-service ranks and therefore were entitled
to more housing space with better facilities. Second, high-level government agencies had
direct control over the allocation of public housing and can channel apartments even to
ordinary employees in their units. In the 1990s, the intended non-governmental real
estate development firms were likely to be managed by or do business through municipal
or district government agencies. For example, the three largest such firms in Tianjin
were directed by a senior adviser of the municipal government (a former vice mayor), the
construction commission of the municipal government (which is the highest authority for
all housing development projects in the city), and the municipal government's real estate
bureau, respectively. These firms make high profits that, in part, become housing funds
for these high-ranking government agencies (Bian 1997). Many government agencies are
also the headquarters of bureaus and companies managing profit-making enterprises or
nonprofit institutions. These government agencies often take over a percentage of the
housing from their subordinating organization by charging housing-processing fees or
retaining part of their housing (Bian 1997).
The emerging private enterprises usually do not provide housing to their
employees, but compensate for this with higher cash wages. Either their employees rely
on housing from their previous state employers, or their spouses still work in state firms.
Some particularly well-financed international joint ventures buy commodified housing
for their employees in China. This category comprises a major share of the high market-
priced housing in the reform period.
Evidence suggests that housing inequalities have been enlarged since economic
reforms (Wu 1996). Even though national-scale investigations are not available within
the author's knowledge, there are local level evidences. A survey of housing conditions
of 273 enterprises in Beijing in 1991 shows that state enterprises and large enterprises
had better housing conditions than collective and small ones (Table 3-7) Work units
belonging to the central government had better housing conditions than local units.
Among work units belonging to the same level of government, institutes and government
agencies generally had better conditions than enterprises because the former occupied a
strategic position in resource allocation.
Table 3-7. A Survey of Housing Conditions among 273 Enterprises in Beijing 1991
Number of enterprises Number of enterprises
Enterprises types with housing provision without housing provision Total
by the enterprise by the enterprise
Ownership
State-owned 127 62 189
Collectively owned 21 61 82
Cooperative 2 0 2
Size
Large enterprise 17 0 17
Medium enterprise 78 16 94
Small enterprise 55 107 162
Source: Zhang et al. (1992) Quoted in Wu (1996)
3.4 Summary
In this section, I discussed the mechanisms of housing inequality both in Socialist
China and in transitioning China. Before the reform, housing production, distribution,
maintenance and management were all conducted at the municipal government and work-
unit level. The allocation through bureaucratic channels emphasizes the types of work
units, occupation, work position, but not income or ethnicity. The central theme of
housing reform is to shift the responsibility of housing more towards the individuals. The
institutional arrangements in the reforms years reinforced the old inequalities and
introduced the new inequalities. The Housing Provident Fund was set up exclusively for
the people with urban household registration, and it is income-regressive, i.e., the higher
income a person has, the more subsidies he or she will receive. The rural-to-urban
migrants are excluded from the urban welfare system, including access to the Fund.
Their low income also makes buying commercial housing not an option for them. In the
reform process, people who are the sitting tenants of good public housing and/or
employed by profit-generating enterprises also benefit from the reform by the selling-off
of old public housing at deeply-discounted prices and other policy changes.
These are important inner mechanisms of housing inequalities in contemporary
China. They do not, by any means, cover all the inequality issues. Through my
observation of urban life in contemporary China, I identified that there are many more
inequality issues in the housing relocation process in urban redevelopment. In the next
Chapter, I present a case of Xiantiandi redevelopment project in Shanghai.
Chapter 4. Case Study: Inequalities in Housing Relocation
of Urban Redevelopment Project, Xintiandi Shanghai 2003
4.1 Introduction
In the last chapter, I discussed the general mechanisms of housing inequalities
both in pre-reform and transitioning China. In a sense, this chapter is more like a
snapshot, capturing the inequalities in the relocation process of the urban redevelopment
projects. I first introduce a brief history of urban redevelopment and move on to discuss
the case of relocation in the Xintiandi redevelopment project in Shanghai in more details.
Recognizing the small size of the interviewee sample (nine relocating families and a
street government officer), I intend to use this study as a pilot project for more extensive
research rather than to present conclusive results.
4.2 A brief history of Urban Redevelopment in Shanghai
Before the economic reform in 1979, redevelopment projects remain sporadic in
urban China due to the constraints of funding. The Chinese cities generally suffered from
dilapidated and overcrowded housing and "the urban landscape was extremely rundown"
before the reform (Wu 2005: 3). Urban redevelopment was top on the government's
agenda in the early phase of the reform. During the 1970s and early 1980s, urban
redevelopment efforts were concentrated on the housing reconstruction by the local
governments. The projects were severely constrained by the limit of the government
financial resources before the private sector was invited into the domain of urban
redevelopment in the early 1990s.
In the 1980s, redevelopment regulations required the on-site replacement of
demolished housing and additional community facilities. Redevelopment projects
usually began with lengthy negotiations between current tenants and the real-estate
development company over property compensation, with the principles dictated by
municipal and provincial governments. In most cases, compensation provided to
households located in these areas was made on an in-kind basis and rarely reflected the
economic value of either the demolished or newly provided units. It was quite common
that the value of replacement units far exceeded those of demolished units (Table 4-1).
District and municipal governments also required redevelopers to construct numerous
public facilities. These facilities were turned over free-of-charge to local governments.
Of the six projects surveyed by the World Bank in Shanghai, four of them were required
to build a substantial area of public facilities (Table 4-2).
Table 4-1. Comparison of the Economic Value of Old Dwelling Units and New In-kind
Replacement Units in Shanghai
Value of Cost of
Housing Original New unit original unit replaced unit Ratio of
Project units unit (sqm) (sqm) (Yuan) (Yuan) new/old
Jiang Guo 1394 15 60 3000 18360 6.12
Hu Lang 553 14 48 2800 14688 5.25
Ying Xiang 1400 22 71 4400 21726 4.94
Oridnary Citizen 3620 28 55 5600 16830 3.01
Hui Yi 264 30 49 6000 14994 2.50
Tian He 204 60 83 12000 25398 2.12
Source: Redevelopment project surveys, 1991, 1992 Dowall (1994)
Table 4-2. Net increase in constructed space and provision of public facilities
Area of additional Public facilities as
Net increase in public facilities percentage of net
Project constructed area (sqm) increase
Oridnary Citizen 208960 36000 17.2
Ying Xiang 157000 17000 10.8
Hu Lang 71411 7500 10.5
Jiang Guo 62179 4300 6.9
Tian He 3320 0 0
Hui Yi -380 0 0
Source: Redevelopment project surveys, 1991, 1992 Dowall (1994)
Based on these observations, Dowall (1992) proposed a more market-driven
approach to urban redevelopment with private investment and cash compensation for
relocated households so as to accelerate urban residential redevelopment in China. The
policies did move in the direction Dowall suggested. Before 1988, urban land in China
was strictly publicly owned and could not be leased for private uses. Cities started to
experiment with land leasing at the turn of the decade and formal policy recognition of
the practice came in 1992. As the land reform and housing privatization proceeded, the
reemergence of property value invited the private investors to join the urban
redevelopment projects. Promoting urban development and local economy growth
replace the reconstruction of residential area as the primary objective of urban
redevelopment on government's agenda. At the end of the 1990s, a prosperous property
market was developed. For instance in Shanghai, the real estate industry was identified
as a "pillar industry" for the urban economy. In terms of value added, real estate was
ranked the fourth after finance, trading, and information industry in Shanghai in 2000
(Shanghai Statistical Bureau 2003). In 1998, the central government tightened
regulations over land leasing, stressing the policy goal of preserving cultivated land.
Since then, more land leasing has taken place within the built-up area where the land
supply is limited. This new land policy has brought higher pressure on the reuse of the
existing built area, the implication being that more urban residents have to be displaced
or relocated to give room to redevelopment projects.
In November 2001, the formal adoption of a monetary relocation compensation
system suggested the further marketization of urban redevelopment. Urban
redevelopment has changed from government-led to property development-driven as the
real estate industry becomes increasingly lucrative and important to the Chinese
economy.
With the economic reform, private investment and foreign investment gained
increasing importance in the economic competition between cities. Improvements of
infrastructure, housing, and slum clearance are viewed as critical not only to city
residents but also to potential investors. Attracting foreign investment through urban
land provision became a common strategy of economic development. Many aggressive
pro-growth policies, including tax incentives to investors, deregulation on land-use
control, and provision of infrastructure funded by public financing, have been formulated
and implemented (Zhang 2002).
Another force promoting urban redevelopment came from the land-leasing
income incentive for the local governments. As a new tax category, land-leasing income
is often considered a local income that does not have to be shared with the central
government (although it remains a controversial topic between the central and local
governments). Land-leasing income has played an important role in local revenue. For
instance, from 1988 to 1997, the Shanghai municipal government leased 138.63 square
kilometers of land for a total land-leasing income of 24 billion yuan (USD 3 billion). On
average, land-leasing income was 11.2% of local revenue every year from 1988 to 1997
in Shanghai (calculated by Zhang 2002). As a result, or as a cost, 1.5 million residents in
Shanghai were displaced from 1991-1997 (Table 4-3).
Table 4-3. Displacement in
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Source: Shanghai Statistics (1995, 1996, 1997, 1998a,
Science Institute (1997). From Zhang (2002)
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4.3 Case Study Back2round: The Taipingqiao Area and the Xintiandi
Redevelopment Project
Taipingqiao (peace bridge) is a densely populated residential area of the Luwan
District in Shanghai. The 52-hectare area comprises 23 residential blocks with a
population of 70,000 (He and Wu 2005). During the colonial period from the middle
nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, the area was part of the French
Concession. French developers built the Shikumen style housing (traditional Chinese
Courthouse with a European twist) in the area in the 1920s. The area is next to the
prosperous commercial street, Huaihai Road with great potential for property
development. The Xintiandi project is a part of the overall Taipingqiao redevelopment
project, which also includes Taipingqiao Park, luxury apartment buildings, etc. (Figure 4-
1,4-2)
Figure 4-1 Xintiandi is Centrally Located in Shanghai
Source: http://home.wangjianshuo.com
Figure 4-2. The Xintiandi and Taipingqiao Area (He and Wu 2005 :7)
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The Luwan district is one of the oldest and most densely populated districts of
Shanghai. The Luwan district government has been actively seeking non-governmental
partners in improving the housing quality in the district. In May 1996, the Luwan district
government and the Hong Kong Shui On Group signed a cooperative agreement on
Taipingqiao redevelopment projects. Every year, two to three blocks will be leased out
and redeveloped based on the negotiated land prices. The leasehold is 50 years,
commencing from the date when each individual leasing contact is signed. The whole
project investment was estimated at around USD 3 billion, almost solely from the Shui
On Group, and the length of the project is about 15 years (He and Wu 2005).
The real estate market in Shanghai took a downturn right after the contract was
signed, which forced the Shui On Group to rethink its plan of building large-scale luxury
housing and office buildings. In 1997, the Xintiandi project was proposed as a present
for the eightieth anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (July 1, 2001) by the
president of Shui On Group, Vincent H. S. Lo (He and Wu 2005). Mr. Lo had a bold
idea of preserving the old "Shikumen" style architecture of the area, developing it into a
flagship commercial and entertainment area, hence increasing the property value of the
entire Taipingqiao area (Figure 4-3). This scheme also accommodates the preservation of
the first CCP Congress Hall located in the Xintiandi project area, abiding by the
stipulation of the Shanghai municipal government. Shui On Group did not start
construction until 1999 due to the Asian Financial Crisis, and the first part of Xintiandi
opened in 2001 (Interview with Street Government Officer, January 2005).
Figure 4-3. Layout of Xintiandi Project
Note:
A: Taipinghu Public Park
B: Xintiandi Bar and Restraunt Area
C: Caihutiandi High-end Residential Apartments
D: Qiyetiandi Office Buildings
E: Shui-On Headquarter in China
Source: www.xintiandi.com
Xintiandi introduced a modem urban lifestyle into the preserved traditional
architectures and became a unique and popular commercial and recreational cite. This
area quickly becomes a place well known among local elites and international
community, reminding people of Old Shanghai's consumer culture in the 1940s with the
traditional architecture. The price of a drink there was on par with prices in London or
New York City. The price of a soda is USD 4.5, and a beer USD 8 (field visit January
2005). Although the buildings and alleys are elaborately preserved, the original residents
have been totally excluded. The return rate of original residents was zero in the new
residential buildings in the Taipingqiao area. These preserved shikumen houses are no
longer homes for middle- to low-income residents, but instead are used for the
entertainment by local elites, expatriates, and tourists (Figure 4-4, 4-5, 4-6).
Figure 4-4. Shikumen Alleys in the Taiping Qiao Area before the redevelopment
Source: www.xintiandi.com
Figure 4-5. The Bar and Restraunt Area of Redeveloped Xintiandi
Source: www.xintiandi.com
Figure 4-6. The Preserved Street Patterns and the Exterior of the Shikumen Buildings
Source: www.xintiandi.com
4.4 Urban Pro-growth Coalition and Property-led Development
In the urban redevelopment process in the late 1990s in China, municipal
government, district government, street government and the developer form an urban pro-
growth coalition, while the urban communities are often excluded from the negotiation
process. Zhang (2002) argued that the system of paid transfer of land-use rights and
common development interests have become the basis of partnership between the
government and the private sector in China. The public ownership of urban land endows
the local government with monopolized land resources and strong decision-making
powers in the urban-redevelopment process. After administrative decentralization, thr
local government's role in delivering policies and strategies, and formulating rules and
regulations, is significantly enhanced. The three levels of local governments have very
different perspectives on the redevelopment process. The municipal government is most
interested in maintaining social stability, and promoting economic development and
sustainable growth. Typical policy interventions include controlling Floor Area Ratio
(FAR) and preventing violence in the relocation process. In the case of Xintiandi
Redevelopment, they made sure that the site of the Chinese Communist Party First
Congress Hall was preserved. In November 2003, the Shanghai municipal government
proposed regulation to decrease construction volume and FAR. The total construction
amount of Taipingqiao projects has been reduced from 1.6 million to 1.3 million square
meters, and the FAR has also correspondingly decreased after negotiation with municipal
government.
On one hand, the district government has mutual interest with the developer as the
government body who signs the lease contract; on the other hand, the district government
is also responsible for delivering the policy made by the municipal government.
Therefore, the district government both regulates the development on behalf of the
municipal government and helps the developer to negotiate with the municipal
government. In the Xintiandi project, Fuxing Construction Development Ltd, a
subordinate real estate development company of Luwan district government, is a nominal
partner of Shui On, contributing only 2-5% of the investment in the project. Fuxing
Construction and Development Ltd. was included because the central government banned
the local government from direct involvement in business and, at the same time, required
a local participator in the foreign-investment project as a gesture of cooperation between
the government and private enterprise. To facilitate the construction of Taipingqiao Park,
the Luwan district government also fought to obtain a favorable policy for the
construction of large-scale public green areas from the municipal government.
Therefore, Shui On actually only had the burden of half of the investment as the
municipality and Luwan district provided the other half. Both Xintiandi and Taiingqiao
Park were proposed as part of the celebration of the CCP eightieth anniversary, obtained
extra priority from the local government.
Working closely with the households, the street government plays an important
role in the execution of relocation and demolition process. When there is a major conflict
in the negotiation between the relocation work team (employed by the district
government) and the households, the street government officers are responsible for
mediating the negotiation and proposing alternative plans. The ultimate goal for the
district government, however, is a fast and smooth relocation process, not protection of
the community's interests. The street government also keeps the personal dossiers of the
residents containing political party affiliation, military service, social-security
information and household registration during the transition period (Interview with the
Street Officer, January 2005).
Throughout the process, Shui On Properties and its partners took charge of the
main redevelopment process from investment and design to construction and
management (He and Wu 2005). Invited by Shui On, an American architectural and
urban design firm, Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill (SOM) drafted the master plan of
Xintiandi. Wood and Zapata Inc., a Boston-based architectural firm specializing in the
adaptive reuse of old buildings, and the Singapore office of Nikken Sekkei International
Ltd. were also invited by Shui On to preserve and redevelop the Shikumen houses in
Xintiandi. The Urban Planning, Design and Research Institute of Shanghai Tongji
University served as architectural consultant.
Local communities have been excluded throughout the redevelopment process. In
most cases, urban residents were unaware of the urban-redevelopment plan until it was
announced by the street office to them as a decision made by the district and municipal
government. People normally are not informed about the demolition and relocation
timeline; they may only collect bits and pieces of information through personal and
unofficial information sources. Residents suffering from unjust treatment can only adopt
individual resistance as collective protests are banned by the government. The
communities are not active participants in this property-led redevelopment. Rather, they
are deemed mainly as part of the redevelopment cost.
4.5 Relocation Negotiation Process
The redevelopment project was co-signed by the Luwan district government and
the developer. As part of the contract, the Yongye Group, a property management
company affiliated with the district government, was in charge of the relocation
negotiation with the households. The Yongye Group recruited the relocation work team,
many of whom were the laid-off workers of the Housing Property Management Bureau in
the Socialist system. The work team was employed officially as government employees
(civil servants) (Interview with Street Government Officer, January 2005). In the first six
months, 1950 households were relocated. In the site clearance of the Taipingqiao Park
(44,054 square meters), more than 3,800 households and 156 work units were relocated
in just 43 days, a record speed (He and Wu 2005).
After the initial announcement of relocation by the Street Government, all the
details were negotiated on a one-on-one basis with the households. The relocating work
team usually sent a male and a female to a household in the evening to negotiate terms of
relocation and to push for early move-out. Each visit lasted around an hour. On average,
at least 20 visits were made before a household signed the agreement (Interview with the
residents, January 2005).
During Phase 3 of the Taipingqiao redevelopment project, both housing and cash
compensation were offered to the residents in the negotiation. Among those households
who chose the housing compensation, most of them never moved into the new housing,
which are usually 2-4 hours away from downtown areas by public transportation). They
sold the new housing right away and purchased second-hand housing in more downtown
areas for convenience to work or school.
4.6 Inequalites in the Relocation Process
The nine families I interviewed in January 2005 used to live on Madang Road,
located in the Phase 3 development zone of the Taipingqiao redevelopment project. All
of the families were relocated from June 2003 to June 2004. As mentioned in the
methodology section in the first chapter, I know one of the interviewees personally, and
asked her to introduce me to the other eight families who used to be her neighbors.
Requested by me, she intentionally chose the families with different backgrounds. The
sample is very small and may not be an accurate representative of the entire
neighborhood. Nonetheless, it is adequate to provide initial evidence supporting my
hypothesis of inequalities in compensation in the urban redevelopment process. Below I
summarize the socio-economic characteristics of the families in Table 4-4.
Table 4-4. Information Summary of the Households Interviewed
Average
Quality of Compensation Per
Case Original Original # of People Compensation Household Person Per Sqm
# Unit (sqm) Unit Registered (yuan) Income (yuan)
1 10 Low 2 550,000 Low 27,500
2 8 Low 2 290,000 Low 18,125
3 13 Low 2 200,000 Medium-Low 7,692
4 14 Medium 3 300,000 Medium-Low 7,143
5 23 Medium 2 230,000 Medium-Low 5,000
6 31 High 2 270,000 Medium-High 4,355
7 24 Low 3 230,000 Medium-High 3,194
8 27 High 6 300,000 Medium 1,852
9 48 Low 7 500,000 Medium-Low 1,488
Notes:
1. Profiles of residents registered with the housing:
#1. Laid off SOE worker and his mom in her 80s, sick in bed (Rural Wife without urban
registration, son without urban registration);
#2. Couple, both are laid off SOE workers;
#3. Retired woman with her son (clerk).
#4. Retired woman, daughter and niece;
#5. Divorced woman (phone operator) with a daughter in school;
#6. Man, manager of an electronics appliances store; daughter and nephew;
#7. Man (small business), Woman (housewife), son working as a technician in a Joint
Venture;
#8. Man (Company Clerk), Woman (hospital administration staff), twin daughters;
Woman's niece and her daughter;
#9. Man (Clerk), Woman (Nurse), Son and Daughter (in school); Man's sister, nephew
and mother;
2. Housing quality index estimated by the author mainly based on the story of the
apartment and direction (facing south or north). None of the apartments have private
bathroom or kitchen.
3. Household income level was also estimated by the author.
4. #5 and #8 family chose to the new housing allocation option; and both of them sold the
new housing on the market without living there. The quoted numbers are the selling price
of the new housing.
Most families improved their housing condition after the relocation in terms of
increasing living area and ownership of private bathroom and kitchen, while sacrificing
the convenience and life style they enjoyed in the original premium downtown location.
During the interview, they pointed to two common issues of inequality during the
relocation process.
The public pronounced policy states that compensation is based on two criteria:
the size of original housing and the headcounts with household registration at the original
housing. In practice, when the Street Government carries out the policy, they make sure
families with difficulties receive preferential treatment. This point was confirmed both
by the officer at the Street Government and the relocating families. Among the nine
relocated families, two families that received the most compensation per square meter per
head were the lowest income families with laid-off workers and sick elderly. The Street
Government prefers that the low-income families would accept the housing method
rather than the cash method to make sure that they are settled. In practice, the poorest
families usually chose the cash method, as the replacement housing is often located 2-4
hours by public transportation from downtown area and more difficult for the low-income
families with sick family members. Also they usually do not know how to make
transactions in the emerging housing market. The Officer commented, "It was
impossible to negotiate hard with a family with no income and sick elderly. They may
commit suicide or the elderly may die in the negotiation process."(Interview with the
street government officer, January 2005) Justified by moral sense and conformed to the
socialist tradition, the preferential treatment of the "families in difficulties" is considered
unequal but equitable, and accepted among most of the relocating families.
On the contrary, the preferential treatment of the families with strong negotiation
power was regarded as a hot inequality issue raised by most of the families I interviewed.
During the relocation process, it is not uncommon for the relocation team to use some
tactics to force the families to move out as early as possible. Many families used the
word "harassment" to describe the frequent visits and phone calls the relocation team
made. Families with schooling children often signed the contract the earliest to give their
children a peaceful environment to study. Many families mentioned, "You need some
one who can talk and fight in the family to really negotiate with them."
In later stages of the negotiation, the relocation team would even dump
construction rubbish and human excrement in front of the apartments whose tenants
refused to sign the moving contract. Evidenced by the interviews, it turned out that those
families with unemployed/self-employed young males are the most powerful in the
lengthy negotiations, while relatively well-off families or families with Party members
often avoided the trouble and accepted the unfavorable terms earlier. Interviewees
confirmed that it was common among the last batch of remaining families to receive cash
compensation ranging from RMB 700,000 to 800,000 for a household of three registered
family members and housing size of around 12 square meters. This is about three times
what the average relocated families received. Most of the families I interviewed were
very angry at this type of inequality. One interviewee said, "I cannot sleep well after I
found out how much compensation the last batch received. It is unfair, but I do not know
what I can do about it now." Another interviewee said, "If you can help me to figure out
a way to sue them, let me know. I would not hesitate to sign my name on the legal files."
4.7 Summary
Inequality in the urban redevelopment and negotiation process manifests itself in
two ways. First, the medium-low income community in the redevelopment area was
excluded from the negotiation process of the redevelopment plan. The government and
the developer made the plan together and announced the decision to the community. In
terms of compensation, the average housing price in Shanghai is 4989 yuan per square
meter in 2003 (China Statistical Annual Book 2004), so that the medium compensation of
5000 yuan per square meter per person in the interview sample is almost exactly the
replacement price. The relocating families lost the premium value of their central
location and were not compensated for the relocation cost. The urban community has
little leverage in the whole process; they do not have clearly defined property rights of
their long-term rental housing, and the authoritarian government in China has banned any
form of collective movement or protest.
Second, the absence of formal compensation standards in the relocation process
gave rise to two distinctively different types of inequalities in the relocation process-the
preferential treatment of the families in difficulties; and of the families with strong
negotiation power, not in terms of social prestige and income but in terms of time and
energy-to a certain extent some characteristics of "rascals and hooligans." I argue that
there is some socialist social welfare legacy in helping out the families in difficulties;
however, the outstanding objective is clearly to accomplish the relocation process as soon
as possible to serve the business interests. The pro-growth coalition between the
business and the government is a norm in market economies, but it is a new phenomenon
in the authoritarian China. As the power of the private sector grows in the reform, the
politically powerful CCP with its monopolistic power over land is starting to partner with
the private sector. The new rich and powerful now live in walled, guarded villas and
modem apartment complexes; while the low-income communities in the city center are
removed for more lucrative businesses. Without election power, the relative weakness of
the civil society makes it almost impossible for the community to participate fully in the
decision-making process.
Chapter 5. Conclusion
In the background of rising intra-urban inequalities in the late 1990s, I explore
how the urban housing policies contribute to the overall inequalities. My major research
question is how mechanisms of housing inequality change with the transition from a
socialist economy to an authoritarian mixed economy in China. In this study, I review
the housing patterns and inequalities in Socialist China, discuss the major aspects of the
housing reform, analyze the mechanisms of the housing inequality in transitioning China
and conduct a case study of the housing relocation process in a major urban
redevelopment project in Shanghai. So far, I have successfully made an initial
confirmation of my hypothesis that both the market system and the remaining socialist
influence are working together to reinforce and worsen the existing inequalities.
The people most affected by housing reform were employers and employees in
the public sector, which was very large due to China's socialist history. Housing reform
is in essence part of a more fundamental adjustment of social and economic distribution
in a transitioning economy. Before the reform, housing inequalities mainly originated
from socio-economic status and the type of the work unit. In the reform, the policy was
to share housing provision and maintenance costs among the state, work units and
individuals. The cost is increasingly borne by individuals with rising wages. However,
the inequalities among people of different socio-economic status became more significant
from both the market mechanism and the remaining Socialist influence. It is crucial what
kind of housing a person occupies at the time, which is a continuation from the Socialist
period. People in good quality apartments would gradually secure their position in those
apartments. They would obtain the use rights to their house through subsidized purchase
and become homeowners. The young people seeking housing would more likely need to
turn to the market with a monetarized payment method. On the contrary, people suffered
in the old system are not likely to improve their circumstances in the new one. The
housing subsidy system, the Housing Provident Fund, is regressive in nature-both the
employee and employer contribute a proportion of the employee's salary to the Fund.
People officially employed in the emerging and growing private sector share the
housing burden between their employers and themselves. The state retreated and no
longer plays a significant role in the provision of housing for this increasing population
group. However, they are still registered with the official Housing Provident Fund, an
institutional arrangement supported by the state, while the rural-to-urban migrants are
totally excluded from urban housing welfare. Most of them crowd into one small rented
room in the suburban areas of large cities, live in the employer-provided dorms, or squat
on the construction field.
I summarize the mechanisms of housing inequalities into three categories: (1) the
income regressive nature of the Housing Provident Fund, (2) the exclusion of rural
migrants from urban housing welfare, and (3) the strengthened work-unit-based
inequalities in the reform years. Beyond these most deeply entrenched inequality
mechanisms, housing inequalities do exist in many subtler forms in contemporary
Chinese urban life. I try to capture those inequalities with a case study of Xintiandi urban
redevelopment in Shanghai. The exclusion of the local residents in the negotiation
process and the failure to adhere to the announced relocation policy clearly illustrate how
the low-to-middle income residents lose out in the negotiation process.
From the analysis, I find that both the market mechanism and remaining Socialist
organizational inequalities contribute to the changing patterns of inequalities in the
transitioning China. On one hand, the central-planning system has significant influence
through institutional arrangements, such as the urban-rural divide and the work unit
arrangements. On the other hand, income becomes increasingly important as the housing
market becomes commercialized. The state and private business form pro-growth league
and relocate the middle-low income households to the suburbs.
Finally, I put housing in a broader socio-economic framework. It is a logical
question to ask what are the implications of enlarging housing inequalities in China-is it
abnormal and causing social unrest and political instability? Or is it building political
solidarity within the favored social groups, which grants legitimacy to the central
government? The experience of other Asian countries and regions during their economic
development era can help us answer the questions. Castells et al. (1990) argued that the
provision of public housing in Singapore helped to make the nation a choice location for
foreign investments in the 1970s. In addition to control over wages and labor relation,
the costs of operation for investors were kept low indirectly because of the lowered
housing cost ensured by the public housing program. The mixed housing scheme also
relieved the ethnical tension and segregation, and helped build the political legitimacy of
the PAP leadership. In Hong Kong, the public housing program was promoted in the
1970s to achieve social stability in the aftermath of the 1960s riots. The policy as
inspired by the Shek Kip Mei fire was an expression of the social paternalism of the
administrative class: to take care of the needy within the limits of the budgetary priorities
geared toward law and order. The housing programs in both countries stimulated
demand, fostered community organizations, and politically enfranchised the residents at
the local level to achieve economic development, social stability, and political hegemony.
(Castells, Goh and Kwok 1990) In contrast, China is privatizing its public housing stock
as part of the overall package of market reform with increasing wage levels. Almost
opposite to the Singapore and Hong Kong experience, the vast majorities suffer from
deteriorating public welfare in China. Illegal land sale and evictions have elicited several
cases of suicide. It seems to me that in China today the masses can only find the
legitimacy of the CCP rule in economic growth, not in social welfare and probably not in
ideology. Studying the dramatic housing inequalities in urban China today, I cannot help
asking myself the question of what will happen if the growth of the economy slows
down. Unemployed and unsheltered, without a social safety net to catch them, to what
can the urban masses resort? With optimism, I view the housing reform as an on-going
process, and the enlarging gap of housing inequalities may be a temporary phenomenon.
As long as economic growth can be sustained for another several decades, the social
welfare system will be able to catch up, and housing will be more equal and inclusive for
the entire urban population.
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